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I - Introduction
Brazil has traditionally been characterized by a culture of inward-looking policy 
making. A big and diversified geographical space with a large population, 
surrounded by neighboring countries with different language and history, yet no 
significant frontier conflict, topped by a century-old history of immigration has led 
the country to concentrate most of its intellectual effort and policy initiatives in the 
domestic market. The systematic exploitation of external markets, based on 
specific policies to foster exports is only four decades old.
This is not to say that the Brazilian economy has been closed to foreigners. The 
presence of foreign firms in the Brazilian productive sector has always been 
significant and the share of foreign-owned firms is one of the highest that can be 
found among developing countries. The intensification of industrialization efforts in 
the mid-1950s relied heavily on foreign investment. Additional favorable policies to 
attract investment were adopted in the mid-1960s, and again in the early 1990s. 
This has hardly changed in the present decade.
Multilateral opening to trade was intensified in the first half of the1990s, together 
with efforts to foster preferential trade on a regional basis. The degree of openness 
of the economy (exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP) increased from an 
average 13.6% in the 1990s to 21.5% in 2000-2008. The imported component of 
the domestic consumption basket and the share of imported producer goods in the 
productive processes have increased quite significantly. No major policy change to 
reduce imports has taken place since the early 1990s.
Foreign direct investment inflow has traditionally been close to US$ 2 billion per 
year. This changed dramatically in the mid-1990s, partly due to the privatization of 
public firms. But even then other factors played a major role, as the share of 
privatization in FDI inflow was less in Brazil than in most other Latin American 
countries. The typical figure for annual FDI inflow has become since the mid-1990s 
some eight to ten times higher than what it used to be. Opportunities in the 
domestic market, coupled to macro stabilization and political/institutional stability 
have increasingly been taken into consideration by potential investors.
A peculiar feature in the present decade is the process of internationalization of 
Brazilian firms, very much like what is being observed in other Latin American 
countries, such as Mexico, Chile and Argentina. In Brazil this has become an
F r o m  U N / E C L A C  a n d  U n i v e r s i d a d e  d e  B r a s i l i a .  O p i n i o n s  h e r e i n  a r e  m y  o w n  a n d  m i g h t  n o t  
c o r r e s p o n d  t o  t h e  o f f i c i a l  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e s e  in s t i t u t i o n s .
2active policy matter, based on the assumption that it is important to have big 
players of domestically-owned capital.
Policies towards the external sector have maintained their basic characteristics 
since the beginning of the present decade, although emphasis has been given to 
some specific aspects. Little doubt remains that the positive outcome - at least until 
recently -  has been clearly a result of the country having profited from very 
favorable circumstances in the international scenario.
That has helped quite significantly to reduce the economy’s vulnerability (in terms 
of external debt indicators), to increase reserves of foreign currencies and to 
maintain market-friendly import policies. This set of characteristics, on its turn, has 
helped to foster the country’s external image and gave support to a more pro­
active positioning in the international scenario.
As is well known, things have changed in the international markets since the 
2008/9 crisis. This has raised some concern with regard to the actual conditions of 
the Brazilian economy to cope with these new circumstances.
This article discusses the main features of the external sector of the Brazilian 
economy, regarding trade flows, foreign investment, the internationalization of 
Brazilian entrepreneurial groups and the short-tenn financial requirements in 
foreign currencies. This is done in four sections, following this Introduction. Next 
section presents a set of basic indicators, as a background picturing of the external 
sector conditions and achievements since year 2000. Section III concentrates on 
merchandise trade. It discusses the basic features and recent changes, as well as 
the recent debate about the composition of the export bill. Section IV deals with the 
financial exposure of the Brazilian economy. It will become clear that it has been in 
this area where the most significant recent achievements have taken place.
Section V presents some final remarks and overall appraisal.
II -  An overall scenario of basic indicators
Brazilian trade relations with the rest of the world in the present decade reversed 
the trade deficits that characterized the second half of the 1990s. Trade surpluses 
increased every single year to reach a record US$ 46 billion in 2006 (one third of 
total exports that year) and have come down to about US$ 25 billion since 2008. At 
the same time the share of Brazilian products in total world exports increased 
marginally from an average of 0,95% in the 1990s to 1,06% in 2000-2008.
At the same time the balance of services and income remained increasingly 
negative, having reached a bottom of US$ 57 billion in 2008. This is hardly 
surprising, given the structural dependence on freight, travelling, remittances, etc., 
as well as the recent evolution of the exchange rate, as will be discussed further 
on.
3The Current Account reached a maximum of US$ 14 billion in 2005, dropping to a 
deficit of close to US$ 30 billion in 20081, a three-years shift of US$ 44 billion. It is 
an unprecedented outcome for the economy to have achieved simultaneously an 
increase of imports together with trade and Current Account surpluses, in a period 
of GDP growth, as Brazil experienced in 2003-2007. Only very peculiar conditions 
allow for such result, another aspect to be elaborated in the next Section.
Net inflow of foreign currency in the second half of the present decade has been 
fostered not only by unprecedented trade surpluses, but also by a significant 
amount of investment -  both FDI and portfolio -  as well as external loans, allowing 
for significant Balance of Payment surplus. The following graphs illustrate the 
major indicators.
S o u r c e .  C e n t r a l  B a n k
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4In 2008 the economy was affected by the international crisis and experienced a 
decrease of its trade surplus and a sharp reduction of portfolio investment, only 
partially compensated in 2009.
The favorable results achieved in the mid-2000s are by and large the outcome of 
an extremely positive scenario, more than the result of specific policies. As a 
matter of fact an estimate of the potential incentives to export has shown2 that total 
incentives have had rather small variation: between 1990 and 2003 they varied 
between a minimum of 24.1% and a maximum of 29.4% and in 2004 they 
corresponded to 33.0% of total export value.
Active administration of the external sector variables has helped as well. Brazilian 
authorities aimed at improving the profile of the external commitments both by 
increasing the amount of foreign currency reserves (from US$ 33 billion in 2000 to 
US$ 207 billion in 2008) as well as reducing the relative weight of the external debt 
(worth US$ 236 billion in 2000 and US$ 267 billion in 2008, with a sharp reduction 
of public external debt) and improving its profile, thus fostering confidence in the 
economy. As a result the ratio of the external debt to total reserves fell constantly 
since 2000, as Graph 7 illustrates. These points will be considered in more details 
in Section IV.
It goes without saying that this signaling of an improved capacity to face external 
commitments3 has indeed contributed quite significantly to the attraction of external 
investment as well as to the willingness to lend by foreign creditors, as shown in 
Graphs 4 and 5.
Be that as it may, the Brazilian economy achieved in 2008 and 2009 an investment 
grade classification by three rating agencies, precisely when the international 
economic scenario was being affected by the crisis. This has further contributed, 
among other things, to attract resources from investment funds.
2 H . C . M o r e i r a ,  M . P a n a r i e l l o  ( 2 0 0 5 ) ,  Os Incentivos às Exportações Brasileiras: 1990 a 2004, 
C E P A L ,  L C / B R S / R . 1 7 6 ,  N o v e m b r o
3 C o u p l e d  t o  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y .
5Graph 7 - External Debt/Reserves
This is not to say that a number of aspects could -  and perhaps should -  have 
been dealt with in a different way, raising criticism to the policies towards the 
external sector. The following section discusses the evidence and some 
controversial issues related to merchandise trade.
Ill -  Merchandise Trade
The present decade has been remarkable, as a period when the Brazilian 
economy: a) maintained its commitment to opening the economy -  the degree of 
openness (exports + imports as a percentage of GDP) was 18% on average during 
the 1990s and went up to 26% in 2000-084 and b) took advantage of a period of 
high global trade growth to improve its export performance. Between 2000 and 
2009 exports increased 178% in current US dollars, surpassing the 129% variation 
of imports. This is a different outcome from the 1990s, when exports increased by 
less than half the variation of imports (75% and 170%, respectively), leading to 
systematic trade deficits in the second half of the decade.
The figures for the whole period conceal, however, quite different situations in the 
first and the second halves of the present decade. From 2001 to 2005 the average 
annual rate of growth of exports was 17%, well above the 7% average growth of 
imports. Since then the situation has reversed quite sharply, with exports 
increasing on average at a yearly rate of 8.4% and imports growing at 18.4% in 
2006-2009. Trade balance is still positive, but has been falling at a sharp, worrying 
pace.
A good deal of the positive outcome of exports in the first half of the present 
decade is clearly explained by exceptionally good conditions in the international 
market for merchandise trade. As shown in Graph 8, there was a remarkable, 
sustained increase in international demand conditions between 2001 and 2004,
4 D a t a  f r o m  t h e  W o r l d  B a n k ,  W o r l d  D e v e l o p m e n t  I n d i c a t o r s .  T h i s  c o m p a r e s  p o o r l y  w i t h  t h e  
c o r r e s p o n d i n g  i n d i c a t o r s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  f o r  t h e  o t h e r  B R I C  c o u n t r i e s  ( C h i n a ,  I n d i a ,  R u s s i a ) ,  w h e r e  
t h e  d e g r e e  o f  o p e n n e s s  is  w e l l  o v e r  4 0 % .
6and a stable but high rate (15%) of yearly growth until 2008, which benefited most 
trading economies.
Graph 8 - Yearly Growth of World Demand for 
Imports - 2000-2008
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These active market conditions have affected international prices. Between 
January/2003 and October/2008, when the financial crisis started to be felt, 
Brazilian terms of trade improved no less than 44.6%, as shown in Graph 9.
Graph 9 - Brazil - Terms of Trade - 2000-2009
S o u r c e :  I p e a d a t a
This favorable outcome is, of course, directly linked to the special conditions in the 
demand for ‘commodities’. From 2000 to 2008 total Brazilian export prices 
increased 88%, boosted by the prices of intermediate goods (96%) and non­
durable goods (88%), whereas capital goods and durable goods experienced an 
improvement of less than 30%.
Table 1 summarizes the main results, for manufactures and non-manufactured 
goods.
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According to Table 1 the increase in prices of all export goods were more intense 
in the present decade than in the previous one, and even more so for basic 
products and semi-manufactures. Variation in export volumes, however, 
corresponded to only a third or less of those registered in the 1990s.
Furthermore, the ratio of the increase in export volume for basic products to the 
increase in manufactures was much higher in 2000-2008 (1:1.87) than in 1990- 
2000 (1:1.13). This has led to a significant change in the composition of the export 
bill towards a higher component of basic products, a quite controversial subject.
Graph 10 illustrates the recent evolution of the structure of Brazilian exports. It is 
clear that there has been a systematic loss in the relative weight of manufactures 
and a corresponding gain by basic products, with their respective shares in total 
exports, changing from a ratio of almost 3:1 in 2000, favoring manufactures, to an 
almost even situation in 2009. This has led to a fierce debate with regard to a 're- 
primarization' of exports.
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Before we go into that discussion, however, two pieces of additional information 
are needed.
First, relative prices have reduced the stimulus to the export activity, via a 
significant exchange rate appreciation. This period comprises a peak level in the 
second semester of 2002 that is clearly an outlier, resulting from political and 
financial uncertainties. To avoid these extreme points we take as reference the 
average exchange rate in the second semester of 2003. The effective exchange 
rate5 appreciated between the second semester of 2003 and December/ 2009 no 
less than 40.3%. But even worse for the exporters of manufactures, this 
appreciation has taken place in a period of sharp increase in real wages in the 
industrial sector, as shown in Graph 11: between March/2003 and December 2008 
real industrial wages increased 55.5%.
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As an outcome, the exchange rate/wage ratio experienced systematic reduction, 
falling 56.0% between the second semester of 2003 and the first semester of 2009, 
as shown in Graph 12. This is a clear indication of loss of attractiveness of the 
export activity for producers in the industrial sector, to the extent that not all 
domestic producers are able to ‘export’ their cost pressure to consumers abroad 
(‘pass-through’).
5 B a s e d  o n  w h o l e s a l e  p r i c e  i n d e x e s .  E s t i m a t e s  b y  F U N C E X .
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S o u r c e :  I p e a d a t a
The second aspect to emphasize is the uneven geographical distribution of 
manufactured exports according to destination. Brazilian manufactures seem to be 
more competitive in some markets. Whatever the reason for this geographical 
concentration, if one considers the share of manufactures in total bilateral exports, 
there are clearly three groups of countries, as indicated in the following graphs.
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For Group 1, comprising other Latin American countries, Brazilian exports are 
mostly manufactured products. Preferential agreements, lower transportation 
costs, similarity of demand structures are clearly some of the reasons that might 
explain this outcome. As a matter of fact, this result has led to criticism of regional 
preferential agreements as a means to force consumers in the region to purchase 
less efficient or dearer products. This set of countries absorbed on average 
between 2000 and 2009 some 21 % of total Brazilian exports, but with a decreasing 
importance, their share being reduced from 23% in 2000 to 19.5% in 2009.
A second set of markets comprise the US and the African continent, where 
manufactures account for between 60 and 80% of Brazilian exports. These 
countries absorbed on average 24% of total Brazilian exports in 2000-2009, but 
with opposing trends: whereas the share of the US market went down from 24% to 
10% between those two years, trade with Africa gained importance, increasing 
from 2.4% to 5.7%. The clear downward trend in the US market is indicative of a 
lack of competitiveness of Brazilian production, mainly in comparison to competing 
Asian suppliers.
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A third set of markets, and where Brazilian performance is most worrying, comprise 
Europe, Asia and the Caribbean. These regions absorbed on average half of total 
Brazilian exports in 2000-2009. Once again, aggregate figures hide different 
trends: the share of the European Union came down from 27.8% to 22.2%, 
whereas Asia (China in particular) more than doubled its share, from 11.5% to 
25.8%, at the same time that the share of the Caribbean countries increased from 
0.5% to 2.1% and Eastern Europe also gained importance, from 0.9% to 2.2%.
Typically Brazilian exports to the Group 3 markets are mostly (over half) non­
manufactured products, and in Asia and the Caribbean the share of manufactures 
is becoming even lower. Asia is the region where trade has been most dynamic in 
recent years, but clearly the strong effect of high commodity prices has been 
decisive in stimulating an increasing share of primary products in total Brazilian 
exports, as suggested in Table 1 above.
Taken together, the fall of manufactures in Brazilian exports to the US, plus the low 
and decreasing share of manufactures in total exports to Europe and Asia make a 
picturing of low competitiveness precisely in the most rich and dynamic markets.
This has led to an intense debate about the ‘re-primarization’ of the Brazilian export 
bill.
This debate is centered on two positions. The most critical appraisals stress: a) the 
negative impact of the exchange rate over manufactured exports and b) the 
increase in domestic demand, which absorbed most of the production in the 
manufacturing sector.
For instance, Souza (2009) sustains that between 1998 and 2008 there has been 
an increase in relative prices favoring commodities and the export volume of 
manufactures fell in comparison to the exports of primary products (from an index 
of 100 in 2005 to 84 in 2008). According to Souza, however, there is no point in 
considering this a result of external demand. Brazilian exports of manufactures 
have grown much less than world exports in 1994-99, recovered up to 2005 and 
have been falling again since then. Furthermore, world exports of manufactures 
have been growing in volume, also in those periods when Brazilian exports have 
stagnated, which means that on a world scale there has been no tendency to a de­
industrialization of exports.
Souza puts emphasis in 1994-2008 having been a period of exchange rate 
appreciation that corresponded to stagnation of manufactured exports. The 
reduction in the share of manufactures in total exports has also to do with the 
dynamism of domestic demand; this is confirmed by the simultaneous boom in 
imports in recent years.
An alternative view questions the very argument that there has been a ‘re- 
primarization’ of the export bill in recent years.
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From a more detailed sector analysis, Puga (2009) argues that in the last 13 years 
there have been no significant changes in the composition of exports and imports 
in favor of commodities: in 2008 the products of agribusiness, metals, metallurgy 
and oil corresponded to 60% of total exports, a figure close to the 58% of 1996 and 
55% in 2002. A closer look at commodities shows as the main change the increase 
-  5 p.p. -  in the importance of oil and fuels, both in imports and exports.
Hence the improvement of trade balance in 2002-2008 does not seem to be 
related to the higher growth of commodities. Between 2002 and 2008 the export 
prices of Brazilian agricultural products had an increase of 85%, well below the 
increase of 132% of international prices for commodities, and little above the 81% 
increase for the prices of total Brazilian exports.
For non-commodities there has been an increase of export prices (40%) above the 
corresponding increase in import prices (32%) in 2002-2008. The producers of 
non-commodities have been able to partially compensate for the overvaluation of 
the exchange rate, via the mechanism of transferring price pressure (‘pass- 
through’) to consumers abroad. The extent of this effect is still an open empirical 
matter6.
These two positions suggest that a good deal of additional empirical work is still 
needed in order to precisely identify the extension and sector concentration of the 
effects of the overvaluation of the exchange rate on the composition of the export 
bill.
A final aspect related to merchandise trade has to do with the structure of the 
export sector. An additional outcome of the overvalued exchange rate7 is its impact 
over the number of exporting and importing firms.
The total number of importing firms increased from 25.542 to 34.033 between 2002 
and 2009, an increase of 8.5 thousand new importers in seven years8. Between 
these two years total exports increased 152%, largely surpassed by the 170% 
increase in total imports.
On the export side this increase has not meant more firms. Instead, it reflects more 
clearly the fact that the same exporters increased their export value: the average 
annual export value per firm increased from US$ 3.5 billion in 2002 to US$ 7.7
6 B a r r o s o  ( 2 0 1 0 )  a n a l y s e s  q u a r t e r l y  d a t a  o f  B r a z i l i a n  e x p o r t s  t o  5 3  d e s t i n a t i o n s  in  1 9 9 7 - 2 0 0 6  a n d  
f i n d s  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  5 8 %  o f  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  a p p r e c i a t i o n  w o u l d  b e  p a s s e d - t h r o u g h  t o  f o r e i g n  
c o n s u m e r  p r i c e s ,  w i t h  B r a z i l i a n  e x p o r t e r s  a b s o r b i n g  a  4 2 %  l o s s  v i a  r e d u c e d  m a r k - u p s ,  w i t h  t h e  
d e g r e e  o f  p a s s - t h r o u g h  b e i n g  p o s i t i v e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  i n t e n s i t y  o f  t h e  p r o d u t i v e  s e c t o r .
7 A s  w e l l  a s  o t h e r  d i s t o r t i o n s ,  s u c h  a s  s t r u c t u r a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  i m p o s e d  b y  i n a d e q u a t e  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ,  
t a x  c o s t s  a n d  o t h e r s .
8 D a t a  f r o m  ' R e a l  v a l o r i z a d o  e l e v a  n ú m e r o  d e  i m p o r t a d o r e s  e  r e d u z  e x p o r t a d o r e s ’ , O  E s t a d o  d e  
S ã o  P a u l o ,  2 8 / 0 2 / 2 0 1 0 .  T h e  n u m b e r  o f  e x p o r t i n g  f i r m s  i n c r e a s e d  f r o m  1 7 4 0 7  in  2 0 0 2  t o  1 9 8 2 3  in  
2 0 0 9 ,  b u t  f i g u r e s  a r e  n o t  s t r i c t l y  c o m p a r a b l e ,  a s  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  i n c l u d e s ( s i n c e  2 0 0 6 )  in  t h e s e  
s t a t i s t i c s  a b o u t  3  t h o u s a n d  f i r m s  t h a t  e x p o r t  s m a l l  v a l u e s  v i a  p o s t a l  s e r v i c e s .
billion in 2009. At the same time the average annual import value per firm 
increased from US$ 1.8 billion to US$ 3.7 billion.
Participation of smaller agents in exporting activities has also been affected. The 
number of micro and small firms involved in the export activity varied from 8854 in 
1998 to 14154 in 2004; but accompanying the exchange rate appreciation that 
number fell to only 10114 in 2008.
What the evidence presented in this section indicates is that the Brazilian economy 
has been affected to a significant extent by the conditions of the international 
market -  influencing the composition of trade flows and the geographical 
distribution of its trade - but also that domestic policies (exchange rate policy in 
particular, but also the usual list of unresolved obstacles to exporters, such as the 
fiscal cost, infrastructure constraints and others) have contributed to determine a 
trade performance that could have been much improved. It is also suggestive that 
regional integration exercises (such as Mercosur and LAIA) might help the 
exporters in some sectors, like manufacturers, but have not been a source of 
dynamism for the export sector as a whole. Next section discusses another 
remarkable recent feature of the external sector, the internationalization of 
Brazilian firms.
Ill -  The internationalization of Brazilian firms
Another peculiar characteristic of the Brazilian external sector in the present 
decade is the process of internationalization of domestically-owned firms. This 
movement started to gain momentum as an initiative by a few large firms with 
significant direct investment abroad, mainly in natural resources-intensive sectors 
(mining, energy, steel makers).
Resource-seeking strategies helped these firms to control their supply of raw 
materials as well as to place them in a stronger competitive position in the 
international market. Graph 16 shows the recent intensification of Brazilian FDI, 
having reached a record US$ 28 billion in 2006.
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During the 1990s Brazilian FDI remained virtually stable at a very low level, with a 
light increase since 1997. In 1998-2000 Brazilian FDI worth about US$ 2 billion 
was recorded but this has changed, with a much intense dynamism, since 2004: 
the stock of Brazilian investment abroad increased by 14% per year until 2006, 
thanks to the improvement in the financial capacity of Brazilian firms in recent 
years, the exchange rate overvaluation, and the strategy of accumulating assets by 
domestic firms aiming at consolidating their position as global players (Ambrozio 
(2009)).
Most of the FDI is merging & acquisition of existing firms, with a small number of 
operations at very high value. Typically Brazilian firms aim at the control of natural 
resources, such as mining and hydrocarbon. The largest operation took place in 
the mining sector9. As for greenfield investments, they take place mostly in the oil 
and gas industry.
Table 2 shows some of the most important Brazilian investors abroad, their sectors 
and the geographical distribution of their investment. As indicated, these six 
companies -  operating in mining, energy and steel industry - are present in Latin 
American and the Caribbean, but have also invested in other continents.
More recently the government has adopted as an explicit policy the stimulus to 
investment abroad as well as the financing -  mostly via BNDES credits -  to 
mergers and acquisition of large companies, as a means to strengthen and 
consolidate selected domestic firms as major players in specific sectors, able to 
face international competition.
9 V a l e  h a s  p u r c h a s e d  a  z i n c  p r o d u c i n g  u n i t .
T a b l e  2  -  S o m e  B r a z i l i a n  T r a n s n a t i o n a l  C o m p a n i e s
C o m p a n y  
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s S e c t o r C o u n t r i e s
Gerdau 
13 countries
Steel Latin America: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, Peru, Venezuela
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico





Mining Latin America : Argentina, Chile, Colombia
North America: USA, Canada
Africa: South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea
Europe: France, Wales, Switzerland, Germany, UK, Norway
Asia: India, Oman, Mongolia, China, Singapore, Indonesia, South Korea, Japan
Oceania: Australia, New Zealand
Petrobras 
26 countries
Energy Latin America: Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, 
Venezuela, Mexico 
North America: USA
Africa: Angola, Lybia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania 
Asia: China, Singapore, India, Iran, Japan, Pakistan 





Latin America & the Caribbean: Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Bahamas
North America: USA, Canada














Meat Latin America: Argentina, Chile, Mexico 
North America: USA 
Europe: UK, Italy, Switzerland 
Africa: Egypt
Asia: China, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan 
Oceania: Australia
Fonte: Carvalho/ Sennes (2009)
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This process of internationalization is also found among Brazilian commercial 
banks. According to the BIS, Brazilian banks have exposure in third markets worth 
US$ 51.4 billion10. Here, too, there are geographical differences. Operations in 
developed economies account to US$ 29 billion, mostly in Europe (US$ 15 billion), 
mainly in the United Kingdom (US$ 3.6 billion) but also in Germany, Belgium, 
Portugal and Spain.
Credits in developing economies are worth US$ 9.7 billion, almost all of it in South 
America: US$ 6 billion in Chile, US$ 1.1 billion in Argentina and US$ 1.1 billion in 
Uruguay. In Asia total credits by Brazilian banks amounts to US$ 609 million, 
almost all of it in South Korea.
What the figures shown in this section indicate is that there has been a clear, 
unprecedented increase in the degree of internationalization of the Brazilian 
economy in recent years, having intensified in the present decade. They are also 
indicative that belonging to preferential trade agreements -  such as Mercosur -  is 
not a sufficient condition to determine the geographical concentration of direct 
investment or bank operations.
IV -  Financial Exposure
Until as recently as the late 1980s the traditional view about the Brazilian economy 
with regard to its external equilibrium was that as a latecomer in the industrial world 
it presented structural characteristics that are typical of a developing economy. 
Basic features comprised an unstable outcome in its trade balance, by and large 
influenced by the terms of trade, a systematic deficit in its services and rent 
account, due to constraints on transportation, payment for technology, remittances, 
etc., as well as a restricted access to capital markets, hence a constant need for 
external financing. Overtime there is a quite strong correlation between the net 
inflow of foreign currencies and GDP growth: the economy could only grow when it 
had no binding external constraint.
What has changed since the beginning of the 1990s is that: a) the diversification of 
exports (at a product level as well as in geographical terms) has allowed for 
additional degrees of freedom in terms of the export dynamism (notwithstanding 
the qualifications discussed in section II); b) broader access to international capital 
market coupled to the attractiveness to foreign investors have facilitated the 
financing of the requirements in foreign currency; c) monetary authorities have 
adopted active policies towards the external debt, comprising the reduction of 
public indebtedness in the external market, changes in the currency composition of 
the debt, increasing the share of commitments in domestic currency, broadening 
the term structure of the debt, together with parallel actions towards increasing the 
stock of foreign currency reserves.
10 D a t a  f r o m  ‘C r e s c e  p r e s e n ç a  d e  b a n c o s  b r a s i l e i r o s  n o  e x t e r i o r ’ , O  E s t a d o  d e  S ã o  P a u l o ,  
0 1 / 0 3 / 2 0 1 0 .
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This has allowed for a significant change in the profile of external commitments, as 
summarized in Table 3.
Debt service fell from over half of total export revenue by 2005 to less than 30%. 
Compared to GDP Brazilian foreign debt has always been smaller than in other 
Latin American countries. Yet that share came down from 19% to 13% between 
2005 and 2009.
Favorable conditions and active policies allowed the country to build up reserves of 
foreign currency to an unprecedented level. Foreign currency reserves 
corresponded to less than a third of total external debt in 2005; four years later it 
surpassed total debt by almost one-fifth.
A low increase in external debt coupled to a sharp increase of reserves, plus the 
accumulation of assets of Brazilian banks and Brazilian credits abroad led to 
negative net indebtedness. The ratio of net external debt to exports varied from 0.9 
in 2005 to -0.4 in 2009, at the same time that the ratio between reserves and debt 
service went up from 0.8 to 5.5 in the same period, meaning a much reduced 
pressure over the foreign currency market.
T a b l e  3  -  I n d i c a t o r s  o f  E x t e r n a l  D e b t
2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9
D e b t  s e r v i c e / e x p o r t s  
( % )
5 5 . 8 4 1 . 3 3 2 . 4 1 9 . 0 2 8 . 6
T o t a l  d e b t / G D P  ( % ) 1 9 . 2 1 5 . 8 1 4 . 1 1 2 .1 1 2 . 9
R e s e r v e s * / t o t a l  d e b t  
( % )
3 1 . 7 4 9 . 7 9 3 . 3 1 0 4 . 3 1 1 8 . 2
N e t  E x t e r n a l  
D e b t / E x p o r t s  ( r a t i o )
0 . 9 0 . 5 - 0 .1 - 0 .1 - 0 . 4
R e s e r v e s / D e b t  s e r v i c e  
( r a t i o )
0 .8 1 . 5 3 . 5 5 . 5 5 . 5
*  l i q u i d i t y
S o u r c e :  C e n t r a l  B a n k
As shown in Section II part of this outcome was made possible by the 
unprecedented results achieved in trade balance, leading to record levels of 
Current Account surpluses, plus the historically high level of inflow of foreign direct 
investment. Graph 17 illustrates the trajectories.
Brazil presented five continuous years of Current Account surpluses, between 
2003 and 2007, reaching an unprecedented level of US$ 14 billion in 2005 and 
2006, corresponding to over 1.5% of GDP. This is all the more surprising when one 
would have expected that a developing economy is more likely to experience 
deficits in its Current Account, for the lack of enough domestic savings.
Between 2001 and 2009 net inflow of FDI in Brazil varied in the range of 1.7 -  
4.0% of GDP. These two movements together have led to unprecedented negative 
financing requirements in all but one year between 2001 and 2009.
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G r a p h  17  -  F i n a n c i n g  R e q u i r e m e n t s  -  2001 -2009
Current Account — — FDI “  Financing Requirements 
S o u r c e :  C e n t r a l  B a n k
Furthermore, the fact that net external debt became negative led to several 
manifestations stressing the fact that the country has become a net creditor in the 
international scenario. This was by and large due to the relatively stable value of 
total debt, from which to deduct an increasing amount of foreign currency reserves. 
This would indicate an increasingly comfortable position in the country’s external 
accounts, and even more so when one takes into account the fact that the share of 
public external debt is quite low.
A rather different result comes out when one considers the amount of net external 
liabilities. There are two basic criteria to measure such indicator. One is to 
accumulate the Current Account deficits. Since Balance of Payments statistics are 
available since 1947, this would correspond to the accumulation of those deficits 
since then.
Graph 18 shows the results. There is a period of improvement between 2003 and 
2007, when the amount of liabilities was systematically reduced, as expected on 
the basis of Graph 17, but a worrying upward trend in the last couple of years: the 
Current Account balance went down from US$ 14 billion in 2006 to minus US$ 28 
billion in 2008, a US$ 42 billion fall in only two years.
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S o u r c e :  C e n t r a l  B a n k
An alternative criterion is divulged by the Central Bank in the ‘International Position 
of Investments’ that accompanies the Balance of Payment statistics. This measure 
computes all external assets and all external liabilities (comprising net FDI flows, 
net position in portfolio investment, external loans, fixed income bonds and 
commercial credits, minus reserves). It takes into account changes in the value of 
assets and liabilities, monetization via gold and variations in SDR positions.
This concept reflects not only the remuneration to loans, but also the return to risk 
capital. Hence, when there is a reduction in the external debt coupled to an 
increase in the inflow of FDI the net debt position of the country reduces, but not so 
its external liabilities, as this would correspond to lower payment of interest but to 
higher remittances to non-residents. This is why its values differ from the previous 
indicator.
According to this criterion the net external liabilities position of Brazil increased 
from US$ 230 billion in 2002 to US$ 588.9 billion in 2009, again indicating a 
worsening of the profile of the country’s external position in absolute values, 
although not so in terms of total domestic production. Table 4 shows the relevant 
figures.
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T a b l e  4  -  E x t e r n a l  L i a b i l i t i e s  ( %  o f  G D P )
2 0 0 1 2 0 0 9
A  - F o r e i g n  D i r e c t  I n v e s t m e n t 2 2 .0 2 5 . 4
B  -  P o r t f o l i o  I n v e s t m e n t 2 7 . 4 3 5 . 6
I n  s t o c k s 6 . 7 2 3 . 8
In  f i x e d  i n c o m e  b o n d s 2 0 . 7 1 1 .8
C  -  C o m m e r c i a l  c r e d i t s  &  l o a n s 1 7 . 8 7 . 6
T o t a l  l i a b i l i t i e s  
D  =  A  +  B  +  C
6 7 . 2 6 8 .6
E  -  B r a z i l i a n  D i r e c t  I n v e s t m e n t  a b r o a d 9 . 0 9 . 9
F  -  P o r t f o l i o  I n v e s t m e n t 1 .2 1 .2
G  -  O t h e r  i n v e s t m e n t 2 . 7 5 . 2
F I -  R e s e r v e s 6 . 5 1 5 . 1
I -  T o t a l  E x t e r n a l  A s s e t s 1 9 . 3 3 1 . 4
J  -  N e t  E x t e r n a l  L i a b i l i t i e s 4 7 . 8 3 7 . 2
S o u r c e :  f i g u r e s  f o r  2 0 0 1  -  B o l e t i m  S O B E E T ,  A n o  V I I ,  N o . 5 5 ,  j u l h o / 2 0 0 8 ;  f o r  2 0 0 9  -  C e n t r a l  B a n k
According to Table 4 there has been in fact a reduction in net external liabilities in 
terms of GDP, from 47.8% to 37.2% between 2001 and 2009. It is worth noticing, 
however, the significant change in the participation of some items: the composition 
of both assets and liabilities has changed throughout the decade.
Among the components of external liabilities there has been a noticeable increase 
in the importance of the inflow of FDI but even more so an increase in the 
investment in stocks, with a corresponding loss of importance of loans and 
commercial credits. It is also remarkable that even with one of the highest real 
interest rates in the planet investment in fixed income was reduced as a proportion 
of GDP, from 21% to 12% between 2001 and 2009. The higher share of FDI and 
the increasing importance of investment in stocks imply a higher degree of pro­
cyclicality in the inflow of resources. It is also an indication of the interest, by non­
resident investors, in the Brazilian stock exchange, what has stimulated the 
entrance of new firms in that market at an unprecedented pace. Long-term 
financing of investment projects has changed of lately.
Among external assets it is worth noticing the increase of about one percentage 
point of GDP in Brazilian investment abroad, as previously discussed (section III). 
‘Other investment’ almost doubled its relative importance, but most important than 
anything else is the impressive increase in the amount of foreign currency 
reserves, from 6.5% to 15% of GDP (second only to the variation in investment in 
stocks).
The picturing that figures in Tables 3 and 4 suggest is that of an economy with 
clearly improved indicators relative to external solvency, far more integrated in the 
international scenario via investment (both inflow and outflow of direct investment, 
as well as portfolio operations), hence less dependent upon loans and quite active 
in making profit out of this situation in order to build up its own ‘self-insurance’ via 
the accumulation of relatively large foreign currency reserves. Yet Graph 18
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reminds us of a worrying situation in the worsening of the external equilibrium 
conditions in recent years.
V -  Final Remarks
This article aimed at presenting the basic features of the Brazilian external sector 
in the first decade of the XXIst century. The overall picturing that comes out from 
the basic indicators is one of an economy that knew how to profit out of very 
favorable international circumstances, by improving its basic financial conditions 
with regard to indebtedness and the building up of self-insurance via actively 
increasing its foreign currency reserves. Little doubt remains that the administration 
of the financial side of the external sector was successful.
It has been helped also by the maintenance of a reliable macroeconomic 
environment (plus political stability) that has helped quite significantly to attract 
foreign investors, at the same time that it allowed the economy to ‘flex its muscles’ 
and promote the strengthening of domestic groups to compete in a better position 
both in the domestic market and abroad.
Nevertheless, this picturing gives margin to increasing concern in two directions. In 
the short-run, in view of the indications of a rapidly worsening condition in the 
Current Account: at the time or writing (early April) there is an increasing concern 
with regard to the forecasts for 2010, with most analysts, including the Central 
Bank, expecting a Current Account deficit insufficiently covered by the inflow of 
direct investment, a quite different scenario from the one described here for the 
2000-2009 period.
A good deal of this deficit is related to a sharp reduction in the trade surplus. This 
leads to concern in the long-term, for the lack of structural policies to sustain the 
external equilibrium, by assuring competitiveness of exports.
Overall it can perhaps be said that most of the focus of the external sector policy 
has been concentrated on reducing the financial constraints. But it has been less 
active in promoting initiatives that might help to overcome the remaining difficulties 
and lack of stimulus to external trade, and this might turn into a high price to be 
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